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National University of Singapore Is Extended Family in Low-Income Countries
Altruistically Linked?
Abstract
Using a micro data from Bangladesh, this paper tests whether an extended family in
low-income countries is altruistically linked. Based on theoretical implications of altruism
model, the paper tests whether interhousehold transfer is negatively related to the recipient’s
income and whether consumption of each of related households is uncorrelated with its own
income, controlling for pooled income of the family. Test results do not support altruism as
the basis for familial economic ties in low-income countries. We fail to reject that transfer
from father, child, or sibling is uncorrelated to the recipient’s income or wealth in most cases;
and households’ non-food consumption is estimated to be strongly correlated with their own
income and wealth, even after related households’ pooled income is controlled for.
Keywords: altruism, interhousehold transfer, dynasty model, low-income country
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1 Introduction
Economic linkages among family members in developing countries are stronger than those in
developed countries. Family in developing countries is likely to live together for longer period
and to transfer money and food more frequently to each other than its counterpart in developed
countries. According to a survey by Cox and Jimenez (1990), 20 to 90 percent of households
in developing countries receive private transfers, while only 15 percent do in the United States
(Cox and Jimenez 1990, Table 1). Furthermore, the transfer received comprises 2 to 20 percent
of household income on average in developing countries, but only 1 percent of household income
in the United States.
What gives rise to the strong economic ties among (extended) family in low-income coun-
tries? It may be strong familial altruism. The degree of familial altruism and economic develop-
ment may not be directly related, but to casual observers, people living in low-income countries
1in the South such as Asia, Latin America, and Africa look ‘family-oriented’ while those in de-
veloped countries in the North such as North America and Europe look ‘individualistic.’ Or
it may be just needs that arise from lack of ﬁnancial institutions in developing countries. Ex-
tended family members may be substitutes for ﬁnancial institutions such as bank and insurance
company and the transfers among them are actually ﬁnancial transactions or quid pro quos.
The nature of familial ties bears a signiﬁcant policy implication. It is well known that, if a
public transfer program is introduced to a society where family members are economically linked
by pure altruism, the program will bring little change to income distribution or individuals’
welfare, because individuals will adjust private transfers so that they neutralize the program’s
desired eﬀects (Barro 1974). For a country that lacks any public transfer program and is about
to introduce one, therefore, it is imperative for its policymakers to be informed of the nature of
private economic linkages in the country, in order for them to devise an eﬀective program. In
that sense, research on the nature of familial economic linkages is more important to developing
countries that gradually discover needs for public transfer programs due to demographic changes
and aging than developed countries with established such programs.
Despite of the need, however, whether an extended family in low-income countries is al-
truistically linked or not has been seldom tested by other means than studying interhousehold
transfers. Ravallion and Dearden (1988), Lillard and Willis (1997), and Cox et al. (1998)
are examples of studies on interhousehold transfer in developing countries. Knowledge of inter-
household transfer behavior such as the relationship between the recipient’s income and transfer
amount provides us with important insights into familial economic linkages, but it has its own
limitations. As pointed out by Altonji et al. (1992), the timing of transfer is arbitrary so
that a study based on a cross-section data may lead to an incorrect inference, and there are
many forms of transfer that cannot be measured (e.g., business partnership, service transfer).
Furthermore, most data on interhousehold transfers lack information on the donors, which may
cause omitted variable bias in estimating the transfer behavior. Pointing out the shortcomings
of interhousehold transfer studies, Altonji et al. (1992) suggest an alternative test of altruism,
namely the test of a dynasty model. Their test is based on an implication of altruism model that
controlling for altruistically linked households’ pooled income, each household’s consumption
should be uncorrelated with its own income. The limitation of their test is that it requires infor-
2mation on income and consumption of each of the potentially altruistically linked households,
which is not readily available from any socioeconomic survey. They overcome the problem by
using split-oﬀ household information in a long panel survey (Panel Study of Income Dynamics),
a luxury we do not have for low-income countries.
Fortunately, a recent data on Bangladesh provides us a unique opportunity to test altruism
as the basis of interhousehold linkages in a low-income country setting by the direct method of
Altonji et al. The Matlab Health and Socioeconomic Survey (MHSS) of Bangladesh in 1996 is
a cross-sectional survey whose unique feature is its outmigrant survey. Over ﬁve hundred out-
migrant households are tracked down and asked the same questions as the original households.
Matching the outmigrants with their original family, we can test the dynasty model. Using
the data, this paper tests whether an extended family in low-income countries is altruistically
linked.
The tests are twofold. One test is based on an altruistic interhousehold transfer model.
The model implies that if households are altruistically linked to each other, interhousehold
transfers must be negatively correlated with the recipient’s income; and reducing the income of
donor household by one dollar and increasing the income of a recipient household by one dollar
reduces the amount transferred by one dollar (Cox 1987, Altonji et al. 1997). The other test
is based on the dynasty model. That is, if households are altruistically linked to each other,
each household’s consumption should be uncorrelated with its own resources, controlling for the
linked households’ pooled resources (Becker 1974, Altonji et al. 1992).
Test results of the paper cast doubt on altruism as the basis for familial economic ties in
low-income countries. In the ﬁrst test, we fail to reject that transfer from father, child, or sibling
is not responsive to the recipient’s income or wealth. In the second test, households’ non-food
consumption is estimated to be strongly correlated with their own income and wealth, even after
related households’ pooled income is controlled for. The test results are in line with those using
the US data of Altonji et al. (1992, 1997). While familial economic linkage looks far stronger
Bangladesh than in the United States, the motivation for them may not be diﬀerent across the
countries.
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives implications of altruism
model that are basis of the tests in this paper. The samples used in the paper and the data set
3from which the samples are extracted, the Matlab Health and Socioeconomic Survey (MHSS),
are described in Section 3. The test results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2 Implications of Altruism Model
If two households are altruistically linked, inter vivos transfers between them may exist. The
implications of altruistic transfer model are well explored in previous studies such as Cox (1987)
and Altonji et al. (1997). The following simple model shows them.
Let us assume that household i cares about household j and determines transfer amount
T to maximize its altruistic utility function given by Ui = U(ci,V (cj)), where ci and cj is the
consumption of household i and j respectively and V (cj) is household j’s utility function. Then
the budget constraints of the households are given by
ci ≤ yi − T (1)
cj ≤ yj + T. (2)
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4Equation (4) implies that as long as i’s consumption is a normal good, the transfer amount
is negatively correlated with the recipient’s income. It also implies that reducing the income
of the donor household i by one dollar and increasing the income of the recipient household j
by one dollar reduces the amount transferred by one dollar. Therefore, we can test whether
interhousehold transfer is motivated by altruism or not by estimating an interhousehold transfer
equation and verifying whether the theoretical implications hold in the data.
The interhousehold transfer model can be modiﬁed into a dynasty model, as shown by
Altonji et al. (1992), that bears another testable implication for altruism. Note that the budget
constraints (1) and (2) may be combined into a single ‘pooled’ budget constraint:
yi + yj = ci + cj (5)
Suppose j takes the transfer from i as given. Then the ﬁrst order condition for household i’s
utility maximization problem subject to the pooled budget constraint is Uc = UvVc = λ, where
λ is the marginal utility of the pooled income. From the condition and the pooled budget
constraint we can solve for ci and cj. It implies that household i and j’s consumption does
not depend on its own income, but on the pooled income. In that sense, household i and j are
regarded members of a dynasty.
Altonji et al. (1992) show that, for a wide range of utility functions, we can test whether
households are altruistically linked or not by estimating a demand function such as the following
cik = β0xik + γyik + αi + uik, (6)
for k = 1,2,...,ni and i = 1,2,...,N, where cik is the consumption of member household k
of dynasty i, xik is the vector of its demographic characteristics, yik is the member household’s
own income, and αi is the ﬁxed eﬀect across member households of the dynasty. Since the
ﬁxed eﬀect αi includes the pooled resources of the dynasty i, the dynasty model implies that if
member households in a dynasty is altruistically linked and the ﬁxed eﬀect is controlled for, γ
must be zero.
53 Data
The household samples used for the study are from the Matlab Health and Socioeconomic Survey
(MHSS). The survey was conducted in 1996 in Matlab, Bangladesh, a rural area south to the
capital city, Dhaka. The survey collected comprehensive information on household economy,
individuals’ demographic, economic, and health status, and community characteristics. The
MHSS comprises of four distinct and separate surveys: main survey, determinants of natural
fertility survey, outmigrant survey, and community/provider survey. The samples used in this
paper are from the main and the outmigrant surveys.
The main survey of the MHSS consists of household and individual level information on
4,538 households who lived in Matlab at the time of survey and were randomly selected for
the interviews. The outmigrant survey, a unique feature of the MHSS, consists of household
and individual speciﬁc information on 552 outmigrants who had left the households of the main
sample between 1982 and the date of the MHSS and not returned to their original households
or neighborhood communities (baris).
The data shows that a substantial number of households in Matlab engage in interhousehold
transfers. 43 percent of the households in the main sample report that their one or more
household members received cash or in-kind transfers from outside in the past year, and 57
percent report that their household members sent transfers to other households. The most
common sources of the transfers received by the household members are the recipient’s son
(27%) and brother (13%).
Transfer data is constructed using non-coresident family information in the main survey.
The MHSS collects information on transfer sent to and received from non-coresident parents,
children, and siblings for the past year, along with demographic and limited economic informa-
tion of theirs. The paper uses data of transfer received by household heads from non-coresident
father, child, and sibling. Excluding heads whose reported household income or total asset value
is not positive in order to minimize confounding eﬀects of outliers, 507 pairs of head–father,
5,378 head–child pairs, and 12,550 head–sibling pairs are used. Summary statistics of the sample
are presented in Table 1.
[Table 1 here.]
6The table shows that child-to-parent transfers are more common and greater in size than
parent-to-child or sibling-to-sibling transfers. 18.6 percent of head–child pairs have had child-
to-parent transfers during the past year, while 11.2 percent of head–father pairs have had
father-to-child transfers and 3 percent of head–sibling pairs have had sibling-to-sibling trans-
fers. Excluding zero transfers, on average, child-to-parent transfer amount is about three times
greater than father-to-child or sibling-to-sibling transfer amount. For those who receive trans-
fer from non-coresident family, transfer seems to be a sizeable addition to their income. The
median ratio of transfer amount received to the recipient’s own household income is 0.14 for
father-to-child transfer, 0.36 for child-to-parent transfer, and 0.08 for sibling-to-sibling transfer
(not shown).
For the test of the dynasty model, each outmigrant household is matched to its original
household in Matlab. Excluding non-matched outmigrant households due to coding errors,
and households whose income or total asset value is not positive or whose income belongs to
the upper 5%, 754 households in total or 377 matched pairs are used for this study. Most
outmigrants were household heads or children of household heads in 1982. the Table 2 shows
summary statistics of the sample.
[Table 2 here.]
The table shows that, on average, the heads of outmigrant households are younger and
better educated with fewer household members than the original household heads. Outmigrants’
average household income for a year is greater than that of the original households by 10000
Bangladesh takas, while their total non-food consumption is smaller than that of the original
households by 2000 takas. It also shows that far less outmigrant households have experienced
family or economic hardship in households during the past year than the original households.
4 Test Results
4.1 Transfer Received
As discussed in section 2, altruism model of transfer bears a strong implication on the relation-
ship between the recipient’s income and the amount of transfer received—it must be monoton-
ically negative. Therefore, a nonnegative relationship between them casts doubt on altruism as
7the motivation for interhousehold transfers.
Using the out-of-household family member information of the MHSS, which includes infor-
mation on transfers to and from non-coresident parents, children, and siblings, the relationship
of the household income with transfer amount received by household head from father, child,
and sibling is estimated.
The estimated model is set up as follows. The basic assumption of the model is that indi-
viduals determine transfer amount to their out-of-household family members in two stages (Cox
1987). In the ﬁrst stage do they decide whether they transfer or not. If they decide to transfer,
in the second stage do they determine the transfer amount. Otherwise, the transfer amount is
zero.
The ﬁrst-stage decision is modelled as follows:
tij = α0 + α1yj + α2Hj + α3Xj + α4Xi + α5Zij + ε, (7)
where tij is i’s latent utility of send a transfer to j, yj is j’s income, Hj is the vector of j’s
household characteristics (asset, experience of family and economic hardship, and household
size), Xj is the vector of j’s individual characteristics (age, age squared, education level, sex,
and marital status), Xi is the vector of i’s individual characteristics (age, education level, sex,
martial status, homestead ownership, farm land ownership, and non-farm business ownership),
Zij is the vector of i-j interaction dummies (frequency of meeting and correspondence), and ε
is the random shock. Inclusion of i-j interaction dummies is motivated by Cox and Rank (1992)
who show that the frequency of contacts has signiﬁcant eﬀects on parent to child transfers. i
transfers to j if and only if tij > 0. If i transfers to j, the transfer amount Tij in the second
stage is assumed to be determined by
Tij = β0 + β1yj + β2Hj + β3Xj + β4Xi + β5Zij + η, (8)
where η is another random shock. Assuming ε and η follow a bivariate standard normal dis-
tribution, coeﬃcient vector of equation (8) is estimated using Heckman’s two-step estimation
method.1 The estimation results are presented in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 reports the estima-
tion results using levels of transfer, income, and asset, while Table 4 reports those using natural
8logarithms of the three variables.
[Tables 3 and 4 here.]
Key coeﬃcients we pay attention to in order to infer the nature of relationship among
extended family members are β1 and β2. If they are linked through altruism, we expect income
coeﬃcient (β1) and asset coeﬃcient to be negative and coeﬃcients of family and economic
hardship to be positive, since they are negative income shocks.
Table 3 shows that recipient’s income is estimated to have little eﬀect on the donor’s transfer
amount decision. The estimated coeﬃcients of recipient’s household income are small and
positive except for that for transfer from sibling—.16 for transfer received from father, .01 for
transfer received from child, and -.01 for transfer received from sibling—and none of them are
statistically diﬀerent from zero at any conventional level. The estimated coeﬃcients of the
recipient’s household asset are even smaller in terms of magnitude and, except that for transfer
from sibling, statistically insigniﬁcant. While transfer amount from child and sibling is estimated
to be positively related with the recipient’s experience of family hardship (death or sickness in
family) and household size, the recipient’s experience of economic hardship (income loss due
to crop loss, price fall, business loss, or unemployment) is estimated to have a negative, but
statistically insigniﬁcant, impact on the transfer amount.
The elasticity estimates presented in Table 4 are similar to the level estimates in Table
3. While the estimated log income coeﬃcients are all negative, their magnitude is small. It is
estimated that the recipient’s 1% income drop induces only .03% increase in transfer from father,
.09% increase in transfer from child, and .03% increase in transfer from sibling. Furthermore,
except for the income coeﬃcient for transfer from child, they are statistically insigniﬁcant.
Estimated log asset coeﬃcients are all positive and statistically signiﬁcant at 5% level for transfer
from child and sibling, but still small in magnitude. Except for family hardship coeﬃcient for
log transfer from sibling, no estimated coeﬃcient of experience of family/economic hardship is
statistically signiﬁcant.
The estimation results summarized above render little support to altruism as the motivation
for interhousehold transfers among extended family members. Both in level and elasticity,
transfer amount is estimated to be extremely irresponsive to the recipient’s income or wealth,
which is inconsistent with the theoretical prediction of altruism model.
94.2 Household Consumption
A demand function for consumption goods speciﬁed in equation (6) is estimated. For consump-
tion, only non-food consumption is counted, because most food consumed is home-grown and
few households report their food expenses. The estimation results can be found in Tables 5
and 6. Table 5 shows the OLS estimation results and Table 6 shows the ﬁxed-eﬀect estimation
results.
[Tables 5 and 6 here.]
As discussed in Section 2, if two households are linked altruistically, each household’s con-
sumption is not limited by its own income, but by the pooled income. Therefore, if a migrant’s
household and his or her original household are altruistically linked, we expect each household’s
own income to have no eﬀect on the household consumption, controlling for the pooled income.
However, results in Tables 5 and 6 show otherwise. For all matched migrant-original house-
holds (the ﬁrst column in the tables), own income and asset have positive and statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect on non-food consumption both in level and elasticity by OLS or ﬁxed ef-
fect model estimation. Increase of household income by 100 Bangladesh Takas is estimated
to increase non-food consumption by 7 Takas by OLS and by 8 Takas by ﬁxed-eﬀect model.
Furthermore, 1% increase in household income is estimated to increase non-food consumption
by .18% by OLS and by .20% by ﬁxed-eﬀect model. The estimates are statistically signiﬁcant
at any conventional level.
One may question using all matched households in estimation, because a sizeable number
of migrants included in the sample are females who are married to a man from another family.
The female migrants are likely to have little inﬂuence on their own household’s economic deci-
sions. The economic linkage between the original household and the female’s household may be
diﬀerent from other cases, because the female’s household is viewed as the in-laws’ household
by the female migrant’s original family. In order to minimize the confounding eﬀects that may
arise from the diﬀerence in interhousehold relationship, we restrict the sample to the migrant
households whose head is the migrant himself or herself and their matched original households.
Estimation results using the restricted sample are presented in the second column of Tables 5
and 6.
10Even with the restricted sample, the estimation results are little diﬀerent from those using
all households. Own household income coeﬃcient is still estimated to be positive and statis-
tically signiﬁcant by both OLS and ﬁxed-eﬀect model estimation. An increase of household
income by 100 Takas is estimated to raise household’s non-food consumption by 12–13 Takas
and 1% increase in own household income is associated with .14%–.16% increase in non-food
consumption.
The third column of Tables 5 and 6 shows the estimated coeﬃcients of equation (6) using the
sample of migrants who stay in Matlab region and their original households. Since the migrant
households and their original households are geographically close, their interhousehold economic
linkages are likely to be stronger than those who live in separate regions. The estimation results
are, however, very similar to those using other samples. That is, the positive eﬀect of own
income on non-food consumption is still strong. In all four speciﬁcations, the own household
income coeﬃcients are positive and statistically signiﬁcant at all popular levels.
It is worthwhile to note that except for two cases own household asset value is estimated
to be positively correlated with non-food consumption with strong statistical signiﬁcance. The
magnitude of the coeﬃcient estimates are very small on level, ranging from .001 to .007. The
estimates of elasticity of non-food consumption with respect to wealth range from .13 to .24.
The estimation results discussed above do not support the dynasty model or the altruistic
linkage between migrant’s and original households. The results, especially of the ﬁxed-eﬀect
model, are inconsistent with the theoretical implication of the dynasty model that each of
altruistically linked households’ consumption should be uncorrelated with its own household
income after controlling for the pooled income.
5 Conclusions
Using a data from Bangladesh, the paper tests two theoretical implications of altruism model—if
two households are altruistically linked, transfer from one household to another should be nega-
tively correlated with the recipient’s income; and altruistically linked households’ consumption
should be uncorrelated with their own household income after controlling for their pooled in-
come. Although familial economic ties seem very strong in low-income countries, the test results
do not support that extended family in low-income countries is altruistically linked. The esti-
11mation results fail to reject that transfer from father, child, or sibling is not responsive to the
recipient’s income or wealth in most cases. Furthermore, households’ non-food consumption
is estimated to be strongly correlated with their own income and wealth, even after related
households’ pooled income is controlled for.
If not altruism, then what motivates individuals to transfer to each other? One may transfer
to another to repay (implicit) loans in the past. Especially, child to parent transfer may be
intended to be repayment of human capital investment by the parent in the child (Johnson
and Whitelaw 1974, Lillard and Willis 1997). Positive and statistically signiﬁcant estimates of
child’s education level coeﬃcient for transfer from child may indicate existence of repayment
motive. In a similar vein, transfer may be a quid pro quo for service received by the donor. Cox
(1987) and Cox and Rank (1992) ﬁnd evidence to support the argument that parent-to-child
transfer is given in exchange for child’s service to parents such as companionship, emotional
support, etc. Transfer may be a means to secure future payment from the recipient (Lucas and
Stark 1985). It may be intended to motivate the recipients to keep providing service to the
donor (Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers 1985).
Cash transfer may be a means to fulﬁl familial obligations that may have little to do with
the recipient’s economic status but much to do with the relationship between the recipient and
donor. For example, eldest sons may be under more or less the same ﬁlial obligations to their
parents regardless of the parents’ economic status, everything else equal. Large and negative
estimated coeﬃcients of meeting frequency dummies for transfer from chid and sibling whose
absolute value increases as meeting frequency increases—for example, a child who never meets
the parents transfers 44,572 takas more to the parents than a child who meets them everyday—
suggest that cash transfer and direct contacts may be substitutes.2 Then what determines the
amount of cash transfer in a given relationship between the donor and the sender must be the
opportunity cost of the donor’s time, not the recipient’s economic status.
Test of the competing hypotheses on non-altruistic motivation for economic linkages de-
scribed above seems to be worth pursued in future research.
Notes
1The income variable in equation (7) is replaced with income quartile dummies.
2Including dummy variables that indicate location of the child’s residence makes the co-
12eﬃcients smaller in absolute value and statistically insigniﬁcant. However, the signs are still
negative and their absolute value increases as meeting frequency increases.
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14Table 1: Summary statistics: samples used for transfer received by household head
Variable Mean/% Mean/% Mean/%
Head–Father Head–Child Head–Sibling
Household characteristics
own income×10−3 40.6 29.5 35.5
(205.1) (62.8) (107.6)
asset×10−3 265.6 2252.1 1224.5
(1906.0) (58638.3) (38635.5)
economic hardship 16.4 21.7 22.9
family hardship 10.5 11.8 13.0
size 5.1 5.1 5.5
(1.6) (2.6) (2.1)
Head’s characteristics
age 36.7 62.2 45.7
(7.7) (9.6) (12.4)
education level 3.0 2.5 3.2
(3.6) (3.3) (3.8)
male 72.2 81.2 83.5
married 93.0 80.5 89.9
Family’s characteristics
age 71.4 29.9 44.2
(11.1) (8.5) (14.4)
some school 35.9 – –
education level – 4.1 2.9
(4.0) (3.7)
male – 40.0 50.3
married – 84.8 85.5
has homestead 90.3 31.9 81.2
has farm land 72.0 19.7 64.5
has non-farm business 3.6 3.2 6.0
Meeting frequency
at least once a year 9.1 26.7 25.9
at least once a month 19.9 46.1 34.8
at least once a week 7.1 5.8 7.1
everyday 61.9 13.8 25.6
Correspondence frequency
at least once a year 1.4 4.8 4.7
at least once a month 2.2 12.2 3.6
at least once a week 0.0 0.2 0.1
everyday 0.5 0.3 0.5
Observations 507 5378 12550
Head received transfer 57 1000 377
Transfer amount received ×10−3 5.3 16.4 5.4
(9.2) (47.0) (13.3)
Note: Standard deviations are in the parentheses.




non-food consumption×10−3 9.1 7.0
(13.0) (14.5)
own household income×10−3 26.4 36.0
(23.4) (25.0)
own asset×10−3 380.4 215.2
(1156.7) (604.2)
family hardship 14.3 5.6
economic hardship 24.7 4.5
head’s age 51.0 36.4
(13.7) (11.3)
head is female 12.5 7.2
head is married 89.1 87.0
head’s education 3.3 4.8
(3.9) (4.3)
household size 5.5 4.0
(2.3) (2.5)
Observations 377 377
16Table 3: Transfer received by household head
Variable Coef. Coef. Coef.




income×10−3 .155 (1.22) .013 (0.38) -.014 (1.47)
asset×10−3 -.003 (0.49) .001 (0.88) .002 (1.79)
economic hardship -4.307 (0.69) -1.956 (0.51) -.757 (0.52)
family hardship 9.980 (1.12) 7.441 (1.59) 2.939 (1.58)
size -.683 (0.56) 1.515 (2.26) .782 (2.31)
Recipient’s characteristics
age -1.172 (0.78) -2.792 (1.71) -.354 (0.91)
age squared 0.032 (1.66) .020 (1.56) .002 (0.42)
education level .503 (1.03) -.009 (0.01) .061 (0.29)
male 3.959 (0.79) -5.744 (0.69) 5.473 (2.34)
married 3.784 (0.55) 2.519 (0.36) -6.036 (1.98)
Sender’s characteristics
age -.251 (1.36) .189 (0.69) -.070 (1.08)
some school -3.631 (0.96) – –
education level – 1.818 (2.15) .117 (0.32)
male – 43.775 (2.70) 2.862 (1.44)
married – -6.859 (1.33) .866 (0.47)
has homestead 4.151 (0.47) -6.055 (0.86) -.322 (0.12)
has farm land 2.255 (0.47) 9.182 (1.43) 3.688 (1.57)
has non-farm business 3.243 (0.39) 7.589 (0.83) 1.471 (0.65)
Recipient meets sendera
at least once a year 8.328 (1.05) -20.090 (3.88) -8.39 (2.58)
at least once a month -3.371 (0.55) -30.171 (5.46) -8.465 (2.03)
at least once a week – -35.203 (3.23) -6.795 (1.51)
everyday -.325 (0.05) -44.572 (4.86) -11.325 (3.09)
Recipient corresponds with sendera
at least once a year -25.182 (1.53) 7.154 (0.95) -.415 (0.12)
at least once a month -9.092 (1.03) 22.014 (2.83) 8.891 (1.78)
at least once a week – 20.894 (0.94) 14.861 (1.61)
everyday – -28.768 (0.61) –
Constant 35.870 (1.37) 23.444 (0.50) 7.421 (0.41)
Mill’s ratio -14.771 (1.61) 45.644 (2.28) 4.251 (0.60)
Obs 507 5378 12550
Uncensored obs 57 1000 377
Note: Absolute asymptotic t-values are in the parentheses.
a Base case: never.
17Table 4: Log Transfer received by household head
Variable Coef. Coef. Coef.




log income -.026 ( 0.13) -.090 (2.51) -.033 (0.55)
log asset .160 ( 1.16) .084 (2.20) .179 (3.20)
economic hardship -.648 ( 0.89) -.008 (0.07) .060 (0.33)
family hardship 1.138 ( 1.07) .190 (1.41) .621 (2.71)
size .028 ( 0.23) .100 (4.81) .151 (3.51)
Recipient’s characteristics
age -.093 ( 0.51) -.045 (0.92) -.002 (0.05)
age squared .003 ( 1.34) 2.8×10−4 (0.76) -2.3×10−4 (0.44)
education level .063 ( 0.96) .027 (1.66) -.005 (0.17)
male 1.361 ( 2.14) .077 (0.32) .621 (2.08)
married -.719 ( 0.97) .101 (0.50) -.735 (1.98)
Sender’s characteristics
age -.039 ( 1.64) .007 (0.90) -.017 (2.18)
some school -.298 ( 0.66) – –
education level – .071 (2.65) .059 (1.33)
male – 1.773 (3.64) .566 (2.34)
married – -.607 (4.03) -.058 (0.26)
has homestead 1.334 ( 1.24) -.205 (0.98) -.153 (0.47)
has farm land .842 ( 1.45) .101 (0.53) .350 (1.17)
has non-farm business -.202 ( 0.22) .336 (1.27) .315 (1.13)
Recipient meets sendera
at least once a year -.211 ( 0.22) -1.149 (7.89) -.542 (1.34)
at least once a month -1.212 ( 1.63) -1.282 (8.20) -.041 (0.08)
at least once a week – -1.265 (3.92) .336 (0.61)
everyday -1.115 ( 1.40) -2.237 (8.22) -.733 (1.61)
Recipient corresponds with sendera
at least once a year -2.816 ( 1.42) -.097 (0.44) .521 (1.23)
at least once a month -.943 ( 0.97) .687 (2.94) 1.231 (1.98)
at least once a week – .256 (0.41) 1.271 (1.10)
everyday – .267 (0.19) –
Constant 8.342 ( 2.29) 7.258 (5.20) 2.904 (1.36)
Mill’s ratio -1.703 ( 2.03) .765 (1.25) .963 (1.12)
Obs 507 5378 12550
Uncensored obs 57 1000 377
Note: Absolute asymptotic t-values are in the parentheses.
a Base case: never.
18Table 5: Household Non-food Consumption – OLS estimation results
Migrant is Migrant is
Variable All head in Matlab
(A) non-food consumption ×10−3
own household income×10−3 .068 ( 2.98) .127 (2.83) .062 (2.03)
own asset×10−3 .002 ( 3.83) .001 (1.01) .007 (7.58)
family hardship .736 ( 0.45) 1.206 (0.40) .883 (0.44)
economic hardship -.458 ( 0.31) -.581 (0.23) -1.492 (0.79)
head’s age .092 ( 2.29) .157 (2.13) .128 (2.61)
head is female 1.404 ( 0.76) 2.887 (1.10) .878 (0.39)
head is married 2.031 ( 1.20) 3.230 (1.33) 2.383 (0.92)
head’s education .431 ( 3.39) .303 (1.35) .142 (0.78)
household size .234 ( 1.03) -.069 (0.15) .282 (0.96)
migrant household -1.210 ( 1.01) -.923 (0.36) -.754 (0.55)
constant -2.883 ( 1.06) -6.560 (1.31) -5.732 (1.48)
R2 .09 .07 .21
(B) Log non-food consumption
log own household income .183 ( 5.79) .136 (2.86) .173 (4.12)
log own asset .156 ( 7.94) .151 (5.20) .211 (6.77)
family hardship .088 ( 0.86) .162 (1.02) .164 (1.11)
economic hardship .123 ( 1.36) .128 (0.95) .040 (0.29)
head’s age .003 ( 0.96) -.001 (0.23) .003 (0.71)
head is female .185 ( 1.51) .146 (0.97) -.014 (0.08)
head is married .261 ( 2.44) .252 (1.86) .351 (1.81)
head’s education .044 ( 5.46) .044 (3.66) .039 (2.81)
household size .060 ( 4.32) .059 (2.47) .071 (3.30)
migrant household .015 ( 0.20) .005 (0.04) -.012 (0.12)
constant 4.036 (11.19) 4.747 (8.70) 3.332 (6.02)
R2 .32 .29 .37
No. of observations 754 326 302
Note: Absolute asymptotic t-values are in the parentheses.
19Table 6: Household Non-food Consumption – Fixed-eﬀect model estimation results
Migrant is Migrant is
Variable All head in Matlab
(A) Non-food consumption ×10−3
own household income×10−3 .078 (2.38) .116 (1.68) .110 (2.43)
own asset×10−3 .002 (2.33) .001 (0.56) .007 (5.33)
family hardship -.483 (0.21) -.101 (0.02) -1.336 (0.47)
economic hardship -1.240 (0.60) -4.289 (1.12) .162 (0.06)
head’s age .030 (0.50) .121 (1.12) .058 (0.76)
head is female 1.326 (0.47) 4.148 (1.00) -.191 (0.05)
head is married 1.513 (0.59) 2.430 (0.64) .137 (0.03)
head’s education .224 (0.91) -.007 (0.02) -.386 (1.02)
household size .492 (1.48) .347 (0.54) .219 (0.49)
migrant household -1.848 (1.32) -.690 (0.22) -1.181 (0.76)
constant .222 (0.05) -3.808 (0.51) -.293 (0.05)
R2 .08 .05 .21
(B) Log Non-food consumption
Log own household income .195 (4.41) .159 (2.07) .208 (3.41)
Log own asset .130 (4.48) .147 (3.21) .238 (4.64)
family hardship .062 (0.46) .153 (0.72) .013 (0.07)
economic hardship .135 (1.11) .006 (0.03) .275 (1.47)
Head’s age .001 (0.22) .003 (0.58) -.001 (0.22)
Head is female .157 (0.88) .276 (1.18) -.182 (0.68)
Head is married .226 (1.45) .174 (0.83) .138 (0.45)
Head’s education .023 (1.57) .015 (0.62) .018 (0.68)
Household size .064 (3.29) .049 (1.54) .041 (1.33)
Migrant household -.006 (0.07) .078 (0.49) -.028 (0.25)
Constant 4.388 (8.51) 4.572 (5.32) 3.292 (4.03)
R2 .31 .27 .37
No. of observations 754 326 302
Note: Absolute asymptotic t-values are in the parentheses.
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